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RECENT CASES
ADVERSE POSSSSoN-PROPmETY SUBJEcr TO PREscmRToN-PRo rY DED-
ICATED TO PUBLIC UsE.-TowN OF ELDORADO V. RrrcHIE GRoc:EY Co., io4 S. W.
549 (ARic.).-Where land donated to a town for street purposes on condition
that it survey the same and lay out streets thereon, and keep them in good
condition, was thereafter, on failure to perform such condition, conveyed to
another, and for more than seven years held adversely to the town, and
permanent and valuable improvements put thereon, title was in the occupant.
The rules laid down by the courts in this matter are exceedingly diverse
and unsatisfactory. In Sheen v. Stothart, 29 La. Ann. 63o, it was stated that
after a dedication to public use, no silence or length of time or non-user can
deprive a public corporation of its power, and until the time arrives when
the land is actually needed for street purposes, no mere non-user will operate
as an abandonment, Reilly v. Racine, 5i Wis. 526; so also in Webb v. Demo-
polis, 95 Ala. i6, the city holds in trust for its citizens and statute of limita-
tions does not run against her; and public rights cannot be destroyed by
long continued trespasses, Kittaning v. Brown, 41 Pa. St 269, therefore, there
is no loss of public right by non-user, Hfd. v. N. Y. & N. E. R. R. Co., 5g
Conn. 250. In Rowan's Ex'rs. v. Town of Portland, 47 Ky. 232, it was said
that ground being dedicated to a town for public use, the right is not lost
for want of use, while in Williams v. First Presbyterian Society of Cincin-
nati, i Ohio St. 478, the court held that the right of a county or town to
property dedicated may be barred by statute of limitations.
APPEAL-HARMLESS ERo-ADMIssIoN oF EVIDENc.-LouIsvjE & N. R.
Co. ET AL, V. GOLLIHUR, 82 N. E. 492 (IND.).-In an action for death in a
railroad collision, caused by negligence of the train dispatcher, the admis-
sion of a letter from a railroad officer, which was pinned to the original dis-
patch, held, under the circumstances, not prejudicial to defendant
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-AuTHoRITY OF ATTORNEY-PREsMPTIoN-AARoN
V. U. S. ET AL., i55 FED. 833.-Held, the entry of appearance for a defendant
by an attorney is presumed to have been authorized, and, to relieve himself
from the effect of such appearance, such defendant has the burden of proving
to the satisfaction of the court that it was unauthorized.
BURGLARY-NATURE AND ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE-BREAING AND ENTER-
ING-STATUTEs.-ANDERSON V. STTE, 104 S. W. 1096 (AP.K).-Held, that
the prying off of a wooden shutter over a window of a store without open-
ing or breaking the window, and the cutting of an inch square hole through
the door of the store too far from the latch to permit the use of an instru-
ment to unfasten the door, did not constitute a breaking or entering sufficient
to sustain a charge of burglary under a statute which provided that burglary
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is committed by breaking or entering the house or other building of another
in the night-time with intent to commit a felony. Hill, C. J., dissenting.
In some states the Common Law definition of burglary is. changed by
statute so that breaking and entering are not both essential, the mere enter-
ing being sufficient with other elements. People v. Barry, 94 Cal. 481; in
other states a breaking is the requirement. Mullins v. Com., 2o S. W. (Ky.)
1035. There exists some want of harmony as to the amount of force that
would be a violation of the security of the house. A screen fastened into
the window with nails was removed by defendant and it was held to be a
breaking. Sims v. State, 136 Ind. 358, while the removal of planks in a par-
tition wall was not burglary. Com. v. Trimmer, i Mass. 476. In another
instance, the pushing open of a screen door, the inner door standing open,
constituted the crime. State v. Conners, 95 Iowa 485. "Forcible" breaking, as
required by some statutes, only expresses the degree of force that was implied
at common law from the word "break." Timmons v. State, 34 Ohio St. 426.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DUE PRocESs op LAw-LicENSEs-Ex PARTE
ACKERMAN, 91 PAC. 429 (CA.).-Held, that an ordinance imposing a license
tax on the keepers of dogs is not invalid for unreasonableness and as pro-
viding for the taking of property without due process of law, because pro-
viding for the destruction of the dog upon which no license tax has been
paid two days after the dog has been impounded, unless it has been redeemed,
without notifying the owner.
License tax on dogs is not a tax in the sense of a burden or charge put
upon persons or property for public uses, Mitchell v. Williams, 27 Md. 62,
but is a mere regulative expedient, and summary destruction of the dogs for
violation of the law, Van Born v. People, 46 Mich. 183, finds its basis in law
of necessity and is imposed by police power, Morewood v. Wakefield, 133
Mass. 24o, and is wholly free from constitutional objection either as depriving
one of property without process or being denied equal protection of the law;
The State v, City of Topeka, 36 Kan. 76; Carter v. Done, I6 Wis. 298, be-
cause, although property rights are recognized in dogs, it is a base and inferior
right, Woolf v. Chalker, 31 Conn. i2r, and further, because the police power
must protect the lives, health, comfort and quiet of all persons and protect
all property within the state, Thorpe v. Rutland, etc., R. R. Co., 27 Vt. 14o,
from destruction and annoyance, City of Hagerstown v. Wither, 86 Md. 293.
Lynn v. State, 33 Tex. Com. Rep. 153, is contra..
CONTRACTs-PARTNERsHn--STATUTE OF FAuDs.-KoYER v. WmLlAmS,
90 P. 135 (CAL.).-Held, that a partnership to buy, hold and sell lands may
be validly formed by parol.
Parol agreements to procure land on joint account are not generally en-
forceable as within the Statute of Frauds. Parsons v. Phelan, 134 Mass. 1o9;.
Brosnan v. Parsons, 63 Mich. 454. Where one party procures title to land
transferred to himself, the other parties to the .agreement cannot compel a
division in the absence of a writing. Robbins v. Kimball, 55 Ark. 416; Young
v. Wheeler, 34 Fed. 98. The courts may, however, even if they refuse. to
consider the question of partnership, enforce the agreement, as a case of
resulting trust. Larkins v. Rhodes, 5 Port. I95; Wallace v. Carpenter, 85
Ill. 59o. Some courts hold that a parol agreement to divide the land itself is
not enforceable. Morton v. Nelson, 145 Ill. 586. But the rule does not apply.
to agreements for the division of the profits arising from the sale of lands.
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Eaton v. Graham, 104 Ill. App. :296; Everhart's App., io6 Pa. 349; contra,
Schultz v. Waldons, 6o N. J. Eq. 7I; Von Trotha v. Bamberger, 15 Col. x.
And it seems that if the partnership is once established it may purchase
lands, although it exists merely in parol. And it is immaterial that the title
is in one of the partners. Allison v. Perry, 13o Ill. 9. It has been said that
the statute is not so broad as to prevent proof by parol of an interest in
land, it being aimed simply at the creation and conveyance of estates in
land. Chester v. Dickerson, 54 N. Y. I. The real distinction between the
cases has been stated to be whether the agreement attempts to transfer an
interest in the land or is an agreement to buy and sell at a joint risk for
profit and loss. Dale v. Hamilton, 5 Hare 383. And it seems to be the
weight of authority that a partnership formed for the purpose of dealing in
lands, not contemplating the creation of any estates or interests other than
a pecuniary interest, may be formed by parol and proved by parol evidence.
Bates v. Babcock, 95 Cal. 479; Dexter v. Blanchard, x Allen 361.
COUNTIES-PUBLIC PuRPosEs-TAxING DISTmIcTS.-STATE EX REL. BOARD
OF COM'RS OF HENDRICKS COUNTY v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF MARION COUNTY, 82
N. E. 482 (IND.).-Held, in exercising the power of improving public high-
ways, the Legislature may, by a general law, provide for taxing districts
without regard to the boundaries of counties, townships, or municipalities.
CRIMINAL LAw-PossEssION OF STOLEN PROPERTY.-STATE v. WRIGHT, 66
ATL. REP. (DEL) 364.-Held, that in order that possession of recently stolen
property unexplained may create a presumption of guilt of the possessor, it
is necessary that his possession of the property should be exclusive.
The general rule seems to be that mere possesion of the stolen property
raises no presumption of guilt. State v. Jennings, 79 Iowa 513; Taliaferia
v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. 411, but besides being recently stolen property,
Brooks v. State, 96 Ga. 353; Salrin v. State, 93 Ind. 55o, for presumption is
stronger or weaker as time is more recent, Satlick v. People, 40 Mich. 292,
the possession must be unexplained, U. S. v. Jones, 3 Fed. Rep. 718, exclu-
sive; Commonwealth v. Millard, I Mass. 6; State v. Scott, 1O9 Mo. 226; Per-
sonal, People v. Hurley, 6o Cal. 74, and must involve a distinct and conscious
assertion of property by the defendant, Regina v. Exall, 4 F. & F. 922;
Knickerbocker v. State, 43 N. Y. 177, the presumption in such case being one
of fact and not lawState v. Raymond, 46 Conn. 345; State v. Hods, 5o N. H.
510.
DAmAGES-ATTEMPT TO ARREST LoSs.-MoGoLLoN GOLD & COPPER Co. V.
STOUT, 91 PAC. 724 (N. M.) Held, that when an injured party finds
that a wrong is being done him, he should use all reasonable means to arrest
the loss, and when a reasonable and bona fide attempt is made to reduce the
damage, even if by such attempts the loss is increased, it does not relieve the
wrong-doer from a suit for the full recovery of the damages claimed.
A person must use ordinary and reasonable care and means to prevent
an injury to his property and he can only recover such damages as could not
by such care and means be avoided. City of Dallas v. Cooper, 34 S. W. 321
(Tex.); Jutte v. Hughes, 67 N. Y. 267. The courts, in general, have held
that evidence of the negligence of one injured to attend to his injuries,
whereby they were aggravated, may be introduced by the defendant in miti-
gation of damages. City of Waxahachia v. Connor, 35 S. W. 692 (Tex.);
RECENT CASES
City of Goshen v. England, 5 L. R. A. 253 (Ind.). The prevailing rule con-
cerning injuries to persons is that where a person is injured by the negli-
gence of another party, and the injured person employs surgeons and doctors
of ordinary skill and care in their profession, and the injury fails to heal
properly, the party injured may recover for the unfavorable result of the
injury, Pullman Palace Car Ca. v. Bluhm, iog Ill. 2o; Radman v. Habersto,
i N. Y. Supp. 56I.
DAMAcGs-ExcEssivE VERDXcr-INjuRiEs.-VEsTER v. RHODE ISLAND CO.,
67 Am. (R. I.) 444.-Held, that a verdict of $2i,ooo for personal injuries
resulting in a miscarriage and an aggravation of a dislocated kidney, not
causing total disability, is excessive.
An Appellate Court will not set aside a verdict on the ground of exces-
sive damages unless it is so excessive as to suggest that the jury was actu-
ated by bias, prejudice, pasion, or some undue influence. Jacobs v. Bangor,
16 Me. 187; Schmidt v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 23 Wis. 186;
Howland v. Oakland St. Ry. Co., io Cal. 513. The trial judge should
exercise his discretion to cut down excessive verdicts in personal injury
cases. Chicago v. Leseth, 43 IIl. App. 480. In actions for personal
torts the law does not fix any precise rule for the admeasurement
of damages, but leaves their assessment to the good sense and unbiased
judgment of the jury. Aldrich v. Palmer, 24 Cal. 513. The amount of dam-
ages awarded should be the amount awarded for injuries of a like nature
and extent. Lockwood v. 23d St. Ry. Co., 7 N. Y. Supp. 663. "We cannot
disturb the verdict, because it may seem to us too large." Brown v. Sulli-
van, 71 Tex. 470. Courts are reluctant to interfere with verdicts of juries
on account of excessive damages. Kennon v. Gilmer, 5 Mont. 273. For a
case somewhat similar in its nature to this one where the court did reduce
the damages, see Hamilton v. Gt. Falls St. Ry. Co., 17 Mont. 334. For some-
what analagous cases where the courts refused to reduce the damages, see
Groves v. Rochester, 39 Hun. (N. Y.) 5 Ga.; Pac. Ry. Co. v. Dooley, 86 Ga.
295.
DiVORCE---EvDENCE---SuFFICENcY.-MURprHY V. MURPHY, 113 N. W. 582.
-Held, there is no hard and fast rule preventing the granting of a divorce
on complainant's testimony alone, though it is undoubtedly the correct rule
that where a divorce is so granted, the right thereto must be very clearly
established.
DIVORCE--FAiLURE TO PAY ALImoNY.-OTILLIO v. OTzmo, 44 So. 799
(LA.).-Held, the failure of a defendant to pay promptly the alimony which
he is ordered to pay by a judgment does not carry with it a contempt of
court pro se and ipso facto as the result of such failure.
JUDGMENT-RES JUDICATA.-PARTIES, SOUTHERN ELECTRIc SEcURITms Co.
Er AL. v. STATE, 44 SOUTH. 785 (Miss.).-Held, where a corporation was not
a party to a bill to restrain another corporation from voting a large amount
of the first corporation's stock because the holding company was a trust, the
judgment in such action would not be binding on the original company in a
subsequent action by the state to forfeit its charter.
EQuITY-JuRiSDicrioN-CREDiToRs AND STOCKHOLDERS OF CORPORATIONS.-
TO Y Er AL. v. ToLERo PORTLAND CEMENT Co. ET AL., 113 N. W. 58o (MICH.).
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-Held, that courts of law are inadequate to protect rights of stockholders
and creditors, and equity will take jurisdiction of a suit involving such rights.
EVDENCE-JUDICIAL NOTICE-MATFRS OF COMMON KNOWLEDGE.-AUTEN
v. BOARD OF DIREcToRs OF SPECIAL SCHOOL DIST. OF Lrra ROCK, 104 S. W.
130 (AR.).-Held, that the court will take judicial notice, as a matter of
common knowledge, that a great majority of medical writers and practitioners
advocate vaccination as an efficient means of preventing smallpox.
Courts are not limited in their researches to legal litbrature, but may con-
sult works on collateral sciences or arts, touching the topic on trial.
Wharton's Ev., section 282, but judicial notice will not be taken of facts
stated in encyclopedias, dictionaries, or other publications unless they are of
such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be
regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person.
Kavlotype Engraving Co. v. Hoke, 3o Fed. 444 Common belief, in order to
become common knowledge, as to be judicially noticed by the State courts,
must be common in the State, although in a matter pertaining to science it
may be strengthened somewhat by the general acceptance of mankind. King
v. Gallun, lO9 U. S. 99; Waller v. State, 38 Ark. 656. Courts will extend the
scope of judicial knowledge so as to keep proper pace with the rapid advance
of art, science and general knowledge, but this extension must be confined
to matters of a general and public nature, Georgia Pacific R. R. Co. v. Gaines,
88 Ala. 377; Wiggin's Ferry Co. v. Chicago & Alton R. R. Co., 5 Mo. App.
347, and should be exercised with caution as judicial minds differ as to what
should be "generally known." Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 37; Miller v. Texas,
etc., R. R. Co., 83 Tex. 518. Judicial notice will not be taken of scientific
facts concerning which men eminent in the particular branch of learning
widely differ. The St. Louis Gas Light Co. v. The American Fire Ins. Co.
of Phil., 33 Mo. App. 348.
HIGHwAYs-EsTABLISHmENT-ADvERsE UsE.-RIVERsIDE TP. v. PENN-
SYLvANIA R. Co., 66 ATL. 433 (N. J.)-eld, that mere adverse user of the
locus quo, acquiesced in for twenty years, will conclusively show abandon-
ment to the public.
Dedication as a common law method of creating public easements, People
v. Dreher, ioi Cal. 271; Cincinnati v. White, 6 Peters 427, differs from title
by prescription, in that no grant is presumed, Beatty v. Kurtk, 2 Pet (U. S.)
566; Stevens v. Nashua, 46 N. H. 192, and when it rests on mere user, which
must be adverse, exclusive, continous and with owner's knowledge and acqui-
escence, Kennedy v. Cumberland, 65 Md. 514; Nelson v. Madison, 17 Fed. Cas.
io, 11o, the question as to length of time such user is necessary to establish
dedication is in hopeless conflict. And although some courts would let each
partcular case be decided acording to its own circumstances, Irwin v. Dixon,
9 Howard (U. S.) 1o; Wood v. Hurd, 34 N. J. L. 9I, the better and more
supported doctrine appears to be that such user must exist for such length of
time that the public accommodation and private rights might be materially
affected by interruption, Noyes v. Ward, i9 Conn. 250; People v. Jones, 6
Mich. 176; in majority of cases, such period being either the regular pre-
scription period, usually twenty years, Hayes v. Honke, 45 Kan. 466; State v.
Savannah, 26 Ga. 665, or the period prescribed by statutes as bar to real
actions, Weiss v. South Bethlehem Borough, 136 Pa. St. 294.
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HoMICIDE-EVIDENCE-DYING DECLARATIONS.-PEOPLE v. BRECHT, io5 N.
Y. SuPP. 436.-The victim of a criminal operation for abortion in answer to
categorical questions by the coroner, stated that she believed she was about
to die and that she hoped God would let her recover.-Held, not sufficient
to establish a belief of impending death and abandonment of hope of recov-
ery necessary for the reception of her statement as a dying declaration.
The situation attending a dying declaration is of such a character that
it is considered by the law as creating an obligation equal to that which is
imposed by a positive oath administered in a court of justice. Woodcock's
Case, I Leach 5oo. They must be made under sense of impending death and
deceased himself must be conscious of his condition. Montgomery v. State,
ii Ohio 424; if he has any hope of recovery they are inadmissable. Com. v.
Roberts, io8 Mass. 296. He need not apprehend immediate dissolution.
Com. v. Cooper, 5 Allen 495; and such apprehension may be expressed in
words or implied from circumstances. Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 229. Such evi-
dence is admissible only in cases of homicide. Wilson v. Boerem, I5 Johns
286; and where the indictment is for the murder of the party making the
declarations. Brown v. Com., 73 Pa. 329.
HuSBAND AND WiFE-ALIENATION OF AFFECrTNs-WIFE's RIGHT TO SUE.
-WHnIE V. WiTE, 9o P. io87 (KAN.).-Held, that the wife has a right of
action for the alienation of the affections of her husband.
At common law, the legal existence of the wife was, for most purposes,
suspended during coverture. I BI. Com. 442. It was said that her right with
respect to her husband's affections and companionship existed but remained
in abeyance because of her disability to sue without joining her husband.
Bennett v. Bennett, 1i6 N. Y. 584. And that the husband could not be
joined with the wife in redress fof a wrong in which he was a participant.
Bassett v. Bassett, 2o Ill. App. 543. But under modern statutes, giving the
wife the right to sue in her own name, her disability is removed and no obsta-
cle remains to the enforcement of her right Westlake v. Westlake, 34 Ohio
St 621. Some courts, however, have denied that the wife had any property
right in her husband at common law. Doe v. Roe, 82 Me. 503. Holding that
statutes giving limited property and contracting rights do not authorize the
maintenance of such an action. Lonstorf v. Lonstorf, 1i8 Wis. i59. And
that in the absence of an express statute she has no right to her husband's
consortium. Hodge v. Wetzler, 69 N. J. L. 49o. Neither has she the right
to maintain an action for mere alienation of the affections of her husband.
Crocker v. Crocker, 98 Fed. 702. Still, a majority of the courts of this coun-
try have entertained this action on behalf of the wife, some, even, without
any discussion of her right to maintain it Bailey v. Bailey, 94 Iowa 598;
Bowersox v. Bowersox, 115 Mich. 24.
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE--DECISIONS PvMWA3LE-FINALITY OF DETERMI-
NATION.-VAN VLISSINGEN V. OLIVER ET AL., 113 N. W. 383 (MINN.)-Held,
a judgment in favor of the defendant in a justice court, dismissing an action
of forcible entry and unlawful detainer and for costs, upon the withdrawal
of the plaintiff from the trial of the case, is a final judgment, and appealable
by the plaintiff. Lewis, J., dissenting.
An appeal will lie only from a final judgment Denslow v. Dodendorf,
47 Neb. 328. And a party cannot appeal from the general findings of a jus-
tice of the peace to the District Court, where no final judgment has been
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rendered, Butt v. Herndon, 36 Kan. 370. But in Morse v. Brownfield, 27 Mo.
224, where a judge entered on his docket the verdict of the jury, but omitted
to render judgment, the other party was allowed to appeal to the Circuit
Court. And a verdict for costs merely is not final and no appeal lies there-
from. Riddle v. Yates, io Neb. 5io. Nor can an appeal be taken from a
judgment of a justice of the peace, rendered upon default. Smith v. French,
46 Conn. 239. But a judgment, dismissing the case, at the costs of the plain-
tiff, is a final judgment from which an appeal can be taken. Fuerman v.
Ruhle, I6 S. W. 536 (Tex.).
MASTER AND SERVANT-RULES-DELEGATION OF DUTY To MAKE RuLEs.-
GASKA ET AT- V. AMERICAN CAR & FOUNDRY Co., IoS S. W. 3 (Mo.).-Held,
the duty of a master to use ordinary care in regulating his business and
prescribing proper rules for its conduct is a personal non-delegable duty.
NEw TRA--VERDIcr CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE.-SLUSHER ET AL. V. PEN-
INGTON, 104 S. W. 354 (Ky.).-Held, where the jury, in disregard of the
evidence, which entitled defendant to a verdict, found for the plaintiff, the
court should grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against
the evidence.
Where the verdict is not supported by the evidence, it is the duty of the
trial court to award a new trial. Lawson v. Mills, i3o Mo. i7o. And even, if
the judges give the case to the jury under instructions, which permit them
to find a verdict which the evidence does not sustain, the other party is enti-
tled to a new trial, although the instructions in the abstract were correct.
Brightman v. Eddy, 97 Mass. 478. But whenever there is any legal and com-
petent evidence submitted to the jury by the court, and a verdict is found,
the court has no legal authority to set aside and grant a new trial on the
ground that the verdict of the jury was without evidence, Warner v. Robert-
son, 13 Ga. 370. And when the proof, though slight, supports the verdict
and is uncontradicted, the court will not disturb it. Chicago & N. W. Ry.
Co. v. Williams, 44 Ill. 176.
NUISANCE-PprVATE NUISANCE-SMOKE AND ODoR-LARD Er Ai. V.
ATLANTIC COAST SANITARY Co., 67 ATLANTIC REP. 387.-Held, that the opera-
tion of a crematory in such a manner as to render uncomfortable for habita-
tion, houses within a distance of 2,000 to 2,500 feet, constitutes a nuisance.
Every business should be carried on in a suitable and convenient place,
and by convenient is meant, not a place which may be convenient to the party
himself, but a place suitable and convenient when the interests of others are
considered. Bamford v. Turnley, 3 Best & S. 65. The apparent divergency
of decisions in this country, McKeon v. See, 51 N. Y. 300; Huckenstein's
Appeal, 70 Penn. St. io2, may be attributed to local or special circumstances.
Cooley on Torts, 7o9. A brewery is sometimes a nuisance. Jones v. Wil-
liams, Ii M. & W., 176, but a distillery is more likely to be one. Smith v.
McConathy, ii Mo. 517. An offensive smell need not be unwholesome to
constitute a nuisance. Davidson v. Isham, 9 N. J. Eq. i89.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-LIARILITY OF UNDIscLosED PRINCIPA.-HILLAN
V. HULE&, 112 N. W. (MICH.) 918. A member of a lodge in Michigan
affiliated with a lodge in Nevada. The chief officer of the latter lodge on the
death of the member notified the Michigan lodge and a daughter thereof.
210
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The telegram to the daughter was delivered to her husband, who authorized
the operator to have the body shipped to Michigan at his expense. The
operator did so and a casket was furnished and the body sent to Michigan,
the undertaker incurring the expenses on the faith of the lodge in Nevada,
and it in turn looked to the Michigan lodge, which guaranteed the charges
of shipment. Held, that the undertaker was entitled to hold the husband
responsible as the undisclosed principal for whom the two lodges acted.
Blair, Hooker and Montgomery, JJ., dissenting.
An undisclosed principal, subsequently discovered, may be held liable on
a contract made by agent. Frank v. Olin, I5 N. Y. St. Rep. 161; Schendel
v. Stevenson, 153 Mass. 351; subject to the qualification that the state of the
account between the principal and the agent is not altered to the detriment
of the principal, I Parsons on Contracts, 63; or where the plaintiff elects to
sue agent after discovering principal. Kingsley v. Davis, 1o4 Mass. 178. As
principal receives a benefit, he should bear burden. Kayton v. Barnett, i6
N. Y. 625. The Common Law doctrine of privity of contract is not fol-
lowed, but the principle is probably the otucome of a common law equity.
Huffcut on Agency, 12o. The agency must first be proved before the prin:
cipal can be affected by the declarations or acts of the agent. Coon v. Curley,
49 Ind. 199.
RAIIOADS-INJURIES TO ANIMALS ON TRACK-FENcES-EviDENCE.-
SMITH v. CHICAGO & R. Ry. Co., ioS S. W. io (Mo.).-Held, evidence in an
action against a railroad company for killing and injuring stock which
entered on its right of way through a gap in the fence left no doubt that
defendant's servants knew of the gap, and tended to show that it was made
with the section boss' consent.
RAILROADs-TREsPASSER ON Tcxcs-LoonouT.-FRY v. ST. Louis I. M.
& S. R. R. Co., 2oo Mo. 377.-Held, that those in charge of a railroad loco-
motive are under no obligation to keep a lookout for pedestrians on the track
between points where they have a right to expect a clear track.
Crossing a railroad track, whether in town or country, is not a trespass,
but walking along a railroad track is a trespass. Glass v. Memphis & Charles-
ton R. R. Co., 94 Ala. 581; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Webb, go Ala. 185. In most
jurisdictions the rule, when not modified by statute, is that railroads are not
bound to be on the lookout for trespassers except in places where they have
reason to anticipate their presence. Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Logsden's
Admr., 78 S. W. 4o9 (Ky.); Embry v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co., i8 Ky. L.
434; Memphis & C. R. R. Co. v. Womack, 84 Ala. i49. A railroad company
is not bound to any act or service in anticipation of trespassers on its track,
nor is the engineer obliged to look out for them, and a trespasser, ventur-
ing upon the track for purposes of his own, assumes all risk of conditions
which may be found there, including the operation of engines and cars.
Sheehan v. St. Paul & D. Ry. Co., 76 Fed. 2o1; Wright v. Railroad Co., 129
Mass. 44o; Railroad Co. v. Humell, 44 Pa. St. 375. The liability of a rail-
road company for the death of a trespasser upon its track depends upon the
failure to exercise the highest possible degree of care to avoid the accident
after the peril is discovered. Gregory, Admr., v. Wabash Ry. Co., 126 Iowa
230; Kelly v. Chicago B. & Q. Ry. Co., 118 Iowa 387. Some courts have
held that the same rule applies to children as well as to adults, Ala. G. S. Ry.
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Co. v. Moorer, ni6 Ala. 642, but the better opinion is contrary. Louisville
N. Ry. Co. v. Logsden's, Admr., supra.
RAPE-EVIDENcE-SuFFICIENCY.-STATE v. KATON, 9i PAC. (WASH.) 250.
There was practically no direct evidence in favor of the prosecution, and the
prosecutrix on the cross-examination admitted that the defendant was not
the father of her child. Held, that the conviction for rape of a female under
the age of consent will be upheld, notwithstanding the impeachment of the
prosecutrix by her own conduct and admissions, and the testimony of other
witnesses. Root, J., dissenting.
The jury can convict for rape on the uncorroborated testimony of the
injured party. Bishop's Crim. Proc. 3d edition, section 968; State v. Fetterly,
33 Wash. 599; People v. Mayes, 66 Cal. 597; State v. Lattin, 29 Conn. 389;
Bennett v. State, 83 Ala. 4o, and it is so held in ten other states. The jury
should be cautioned against conviction on the testimony of the prosecutrix
alone, uncorroborated by other testimony or by direct circumstances. People
v. Benson, 6 Cal. 221. Statute requires that the testimony of the prosecutrix
must be corroborated. State v. Bartlett, 127 Io. 689. And likewise in several
other states," although not regulated by statute. Davis v. State, i2o Ga. 433.
As a general rule, the reputation of the prosecutrix for chastity may be
impeached, but not by proof of particular instances of unchastity. Shirwin
v. People, 69 Ill. 55; McQuirk v. State, 84 Ala. 435; Rice v. State, 35 Fla.
236. In Vermont, particular instances of unchastity may be shown. State
v. Reed, 39 Vt. 417. Where crime charged is rape on a female child under
the age of consent, testimony as to her general reputation for chastity is not
admissible. State v. Hilberg, 22 Utah 27; Plunkett v. State, 72 Ark. 4o9;
State v. Whitesell, 142 Mo. 467. But to refute corroborative evidence it may
be shown that the prosecutrix has had intercourse with certain other men.
People v. Flaherty, 29 N. Y. Sup. 641.
SHIPPING-DUTY OF STEAmERs wITH RESPECT TO SWELL-STRucruRES AT
Docx, JAMES SHEWAN v. NEw ENG. NAVIGATION CO., 155 FED. 86o.-Held, the
duty of a passing steamer with respect to causing dangerous swells is the
same toward a floating dry dock permanently located alongside of a pier as
toward vessels in the same situation, and she is bound to exercise reasonable
care to avoid causing injury to such dock, having regard to the character
of the structure and its greater liability to injury from its size, and therefore,
longer subjection to the action of the swells; and it is also the duty of the
owner of the dock to take into account the same liability to injury from swells
and to make reasonable provisions against it.
TRADE UNioNs-STaiKEs-IjuNcTioNs.-SEA=L Mr. Co. v. TERRY ET
Ar., io6 N. Y. SupP. 438.-Held, that an injunction against striking members
of a labor union will not be granted so as to prevent defendants from peace-
fully picketing, in reasonable numbers for the purpose of observation only,
the premises of their former employer from the highways or streets in the
vicinity of the employer's place of business and endeavoring, by argument,
persuasion or appeal only, to prevent other persons from becoming em-
ployees.
The narrow doctrine, which is still held in a number of states, is that
picketing by a labor organization in a strike, in and of itself, when properly
conducted, is lawful, but when accompanied by violence or any manner of
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coercion or intimidation, to prevent others from entering or remaining in the
service of their employer, is unlawful, Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ruef et al., 120
Fed. Io2; Butterick Pub. Co. v. Typog. Union, No. 6, 1oo N. Y. Supp. 292;
Levy v. Rosenstein, 66 N. Y. Supp. IOi; but a broader and better doctrine
that there may be a moral intimidation was announced by the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92; this was among the
first of the judicial steps taken in this country towards overturning the rule
permitting peaceable picketing and was a forerunner of the later rule that
there can be no such thing as peaceable picketing and consequently, that all
picketing is illegal. Franklin Union v. People, 220 IIl. 355; Beck v. Railway
Teamsters Protective Union, 118 Mich. 497. Picketing will be enjoined as a
continuing injury to business, notwithstanding it may be punishable as a
crime, and the right to injuction against it has been based upon the ground
that the aggrieved person is entitled to protection of his "probable expectancy,"
which is defined as the right to enjoy a free and natural condition of the
labor market. Consolidating Steel, etc., Co. v. Murray, 8o Fed. 811; Arthur
v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 3io.
TniAL-RE M xs oF CouxsEL--ExCEPTIONS.-PPsSY v. RHODE ISLAND
Co., 67 ATL. (R. I.) 447.-Held, an exception does not generally lie to the
remark of counsel, but to the refusal to charge the jury in regard thereto,
when reasonably requested so to do.
This is rather an odd way of stating the rule which is usually put thus:
"The remark must be objected to or called to the attention of the court in
some way when made, or at least during the trial, that opportunity may be
given to the court to prevent or correct any abuse." Ill. v. Evanston, I5O
IlL. 616; State v. Ward, 6I Vt 153; State v. Waters, 63 Me. 128. When no
exception is taken to the remarks of counsel, and no motion is made to
exclude them, objection to them will not be considered on appeal. Nelson
v. Shelby, etc., Co., 96 Ala. 515. If the court interferes and the objection-
able remark is promptly withdrawn, the error will generally be deemed to
be cured. Dunlap v. U. S., 165 U. S. 486, 498. An abuse of attorney's priv-
ilege in this regard may be so flagrant as to warrant reversal, although the
court and opposite counsel neglected to discharge their duty. Klink v. Peo-
ple, 16 Colo. 467. It has been held that it is error for the court to allow
counsel to discuss irrelevant matter before the jury, and that this error is not
cured by the failure of opposite counsel to interpose objection at the time.
Willis v. McNeill, 57 Tex. 465; Prather v. McClelland, 26 S. W. (Ct of Civ.
App., Tex., 1894) 657. It has been held that it is not necessary for the coun-
sel to present point of objection, and if he does not do so, the duty is where
it properly belongs, on the judge. Berry v. Georgia, io Ga. 5I.
TROVER AND CoNVEaSION-WHAT CONSTITUTES-MEDINA GAS AND ELEC-
Tmic LIGHT Co. v. BUFFALO LOAN, TRUST & SAFE DEPOSIT Co., IO4 N. Y. Supp.
625. Plaintiff corporation executed to defendant, as trustee, a mortgage to
secure the payment of certain bonds, depositing the bonds with defendant
Subsequently, one of the officers of the plaintiff, who owned practically the
entire stock of the corporation, agreed with the defendant that the bonds in
its possession should be pledged to it for his own individual indebtedness.
Held, that the subsequent delivery of the bonds by the defendant to another
constituted a conversion by the defendant of the bonds. Scott and Laughlin,
JJ., dissenting.
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The gist of the action of conversion has been said to be the deprivation
of the plaintiff's property. Keyworth v. Hill, 3 Barn. & Ald. 685. But it is
also necessary that the bailee claim some title in himself or in a third person.
Heald v.' Cary, ii C. B. 976. The mere wrongful asportation does not amount
to a conversion unless there is an intent to convert it to one's own use or the
use of a third person. Fouldes v. Willoughby, 8 M. & W. 540. However,
the wrongful intent is not always an essential element in a conversion. It is
enough if the rightful owner has been deprived of his property by some
unauthorized act of another assuming control over it. Boyce v. Brockway,
31 N. Y. 49o. It has been said that when a bailee comes into possession law-
fully there is no apparent inconsistency between his possession and the
plaintiff's ownership until a demand and refusal. Pease v. Smith, 61 N. Y.
477; Polk's Adm'rs v. Allen, i9 Mo. 467. But as a demand and refusal are
only evidences of a conversion, if an actual conversion is proved, there is no
necessity to prove a demand in order to sustain an action. State v. Pattern,
49 Me. 383; Baker v. Lothrop, 155 Mass. 376. It has been held that a mere
paper sale of another's goods without transferring possession is no evidence
of a conversion. Davis v. Buffum, 51 Me. i6o. It is otherwise, however,
where the defendant has the actual possession of the goods to which he
asserts ownership or undertakes to sell. And it would seem, in such a case,
that the conversion takes place when the defendant takes upon himself the
right and assumes control of the property. Gentry v. Madden, 3 Ark. 127.
There can be no doubt that there would be an actual conversion if the defend-
ant wrongfully parted with possession of the property. St. John v. O'Con-
nell, 7 Port. 466; Hotchkiss v. Hunt, 49 Me. 213.
WIsLs-TESTAENTARY CAPAcITY-BELIEF ix SpmrruAISaM Owm" v.
CRUMBAUGH, 81 N. E. (In.) io44.-Held, that a mere belief in spiritual-
ism is no evidence of monomania or insane delusion.
Belief in spiritualism is a conviction arising from evidence or informa-
tion, Middleditch v. Williams, 48 L. R. A. (N. J.) 738, Humphreys v. McCall,
9 Cal. 62, which, if permitted to constantly occupy his mind, might have the
effect of unbalancing it, Addington v. Wilson, 5 Md. 137, but is never insan-
ity nor evidence of an insane delusion, Otto v. Doty, 61 Iowa 23; In re Smith's
Will, 52 Wis. 543; Lyon v. Home, L. R. 6 Eq. 655, except when they are such
beliefs as a reasonable man would not, under the circumstances, entertain,
Kimberlys' Appeal, 68 Conn. 428, thus differing from an insane delusion,
which is a pigment of the imagination, Robinson v. Adams, 62 Me. 369;
Am. Seamen's Friend Society v. Hopper, 33 N. Y. 61g, springing only from a
diseased and morbid mind, having no foundation in reality, Banks v. Good-
fellow, L. R. 52 B. 56o; Taylor v. Trick, 165 Pa. 586.
